All Things Reform: Electronic voting

Showing posts with label Electronic voting. Show all posts

Sunday, April 26, 2009

The BRAD BLOG: The most important, most doable federal election reforms needed

Government reform orgs. deliver news on major events within their areas of expertise.
From: The BRAD BLOG

Top Federal Election Reform Priorities

Blogged by Brad Friedman on 3/10/2009

A draft summary of what I see as the most important, most doable, federal election reform priorities for 2009...

Okay, so I've been asked on several occasions, since the election last year, what I regard as the top priorities for election reform in the U.S. of A. In hopes of keeping it simple, stupid, at least until I hear opinions on these back from you folks, here is a summary list of the most important, and most eminently-doable-at-the-federal-level reforms as I see it.

I welcome your thoughts, recommended changes, additions, etc. For the moment, this is not meant as a comprehensive list of all needed reforms, particularly at the various local levels. But it's meant as a list of the big ones, as I seem them, and the ones for which I believe we could actually find a consensus in this Congress sooner rather than later. Nor is this meant as whitepaper with arguments and details for each item. But hopefully most regular readers of The BRAD BLOG will understand what these reforms entail and why they are necessary, as written in this summarized, simple list.

After hearing from you all, I may post an updated version later and/or set these up on their own page, in order track legislation for each of them as they roll (or don't) through Congress. Here's the list...

Hand-Marked Paper Ballots For All: All ballot selections, in all federal elections, must be hand-marked by the voter, on paper ballots, except for ballots marked by a non-tabulating assistive device, as may be required to meet HAVA's accessibility voting mandate, one per polling place, for use by those who wish such assistance in order to vote privately and independently.

Fully Disclosed Hardware & Software: All electronic voting and tabulating systems (eg. ballot tabulators, ballot marking devices for optional use voters who wish assistance), in jurisdictions that may use such systems, must employ fully open source, publicly disclosed hardware and software.

Precinct-Based Counting: Ballots cast at the precinct are to be counted in a fully public, transparent, and verifiable manner at the local precinct level, with full citizen observation allowed by law, and results posted publicly at the precinct before either ballots or results are forwarded to any other location(s).

Voting Databases Released: All vote tabulation databases are to be made available to the public.

Full Transparency: All ballot counting/tabulation/auditing processes are to be fully open and transparent to any and all members of the public.

No Remote/Networked Communications: No voting system may have remote communication capabilities, infrared or bluetooth capabilities, or be attached to the Internet or to a local area network at any time.

No Internet Voting: No ballots may be cast over the Internet.

Disclosure of Federal Testing Processes/Results: All federal voting system testing/certification processes must be fully documented and results made immediately available for public inspection.

Outlaw Deceptive Practices: Deceptive practices (such as disinformation concerning Election Day, poll locations, and registration information and processes, etc.), voter caging (the removal of voters from the rolls without notification or process for appeal), and voter intimidation (eg. use of threats, uniformed officers at the polls, etc.) shall be outlawed. These laws shall be enforced and penalized as felony crimes.

Same Day Registration: Same day voter registration will be mandated for all voters in federal elections.

Ban Disenfranchising Photo ID Restrictions: Restrictive Photo ID measures at the polling place must be outlawed. Federalize the types of voter ID that may be required at the polls for federal elections.

Notification of Rejected Absentee Ballots: All voters are to be notified and allowed timely opportunity to appeal the rejection of their absentee ballots for any reason.

Make Election Day a Holiday: Election Day must be made a federal holiday.

Move Election Day to Wednesday: Election Day is to be moved to Wednesday. (Would likely require a Constitutional amendment - see this for a quick explanation of why moving it to Wednesday is a good idea.)

"Right to Vote" Amendment: Amend the U.S. Constitution to declare a federal "Right to Vote" in all federal elections.

Disenfranchisement a Felony Crime: The purposeful disenfranchisement of any legal voter, for any reason, by any person, in any election, at any time, is to be a felony crime. Each individual case of such disenfranchisement is to be prosecutable to the full extent of the law.

So what are your thoughts?...

[Original BRAD BLOG article accepts comments]

>All Things Reform Mobile: allthingsreform.mofuse.mobi >Capitol Switchboard: 202-224-3121 (not toll-free) >US House/Senate Mobile: bit.ly/members >Contact your reps tips: bit.ly/dear >Shortened All Things Reform URL: bit.ly/dw

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

US Election Assistance Commission very selective in reporting of CIA analysis of electronic voting machines

Government reform orgs. deliver news on major events within their areas of expertise.
From: The Examiner

U.S. Election Assistance Commission snubs CIA analyst's warning about electronic voting machines

March 25, 3:59 PM

U.S. Election Assistance Commission seal

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission was created to oversee federal elections and regulate the electronic voting machine industry. Slow to the task and led by holdovers from the abandoned National Association of State Election Directors oversight scheme, the EAC has inched along developing a bureaucratic infrastructure to address the problems of electronic voting machines.

The main problem with the software driven devices used in electronic voting machines is that they can be hacked by undetectable malicious code or in simple language, the machines cannot be trusted.

Academic studies are piling up against the various voting machine manufacturers over the security and reliability of the machines. In February the EAC arranged for a cyber-security specialist at the Central Intelligence Agency to give them a heads-up about hacking.

The EAC website has posted Steve Stigall's CIA resume for all the public to read. The EAC also posted a summary of his remarks. However, what the EAC did not post were Stigall's dire warnings about the dangers of the voting machines.

What the EAC told us.

Steve Stigall started working for the CIA in 1985. Stigall's early analytic career at the spy agency was focused on Soviet strategic missile forces. "Since 1995 he has specialized in foreign computer threats. In 2000 Mr. Stigall was inducted into CIA's Senior Analytic Service."

Describing a "growing potential for cyber vote fraud" the EAC summarized Stigall's remarks.

"An analysis of foreign countries' experience with computerizing their election systems has revealed challenges to the electronic safeguarding of increasingly computer-dependent elections. This presentation, while not addressing US-specific approaches, offers insights for policymakers in this country who seek to enhance the role of computers and computer networks in the electoral process."

What the EAC didn't tell us.

McClatchy Newspapers has obtained a transcript of Stigall's warning to the EAC which they kept from the official website and have not shared with 'policymakers' in any public manner.

Stigall told the EAC that the CIA had reported apparent vote-rigging in Venezuela, Macedonia and Ukraine. The news report was of "disturbing lessons for the United States" where Stigall warned of five entry points where a "malicious actor" could "make bad things happen."

Stigall told the EAC that any voting machine connected to the internet could be hacked and that machines not hooked up could be hacked wirelessly if the machine had a wireless card embedded in its hardware.

Stigall said that most web-based ballot systems were proven to be insecure. The CIA began studying foreign voting systems after concluding that foreigners might try to hack American elections to alter the outcome.

Stigall suggested that even an audit of the Venezuelan alleged-rigging may have been fixed. The CIA focused on Venezuela for study in part because Smartmatic, a Venezuela-connected company, owned Sequoia Voting Systems until 2007. The machines with a foreign connection were in use in 16 states and the District of Columbia raising concern at the CIA.

Stigall explained that in the country of Georgia people who died in the 1700's were added to the electronic voter registry. While in Macedonia the number of Albanians' purged from electronic voting lists amounted to "voter genocide".

According to the McClatchy story, Stigall asked the EAC not identify him yet the Commission posted his resume anyway.

[Original Examiner article accepts comments]

Saturday, October 11, 2008

Voting equipment industry again in denial over voting problems

Government reform orgs. deliver news on major events within their areas of expertise.
From: THE BRAD BLOG

D.C. Report Finds E-Vote Company at Fault for Thousands of 'Phantom Votes' Recorded in Last Month's Primary

Election Board Finds Sequoia Voting Systems 'Too Quick to Exonerate Self,' As Evidence Indicates Hardware and Software to Blame...
Blogged by Brad Friedman on 10/11/2008 10:00AM

After failing to count votes accurately in a number of recent elections in FL, NJ, and D.C., a report has now been released by the D.C. Board of Elections noting that, as it turns out, Michelle Shafer, official mouthpiece for both Sequoia Voting Systems and the election industry's PR outfit, Election Technology Council (ETC), has once again been misleading the public about Sequoia's bad voting equipment --- both touch-screen and paper ballot systems --- and the fact that they don't work.

The D.C. Board released its report on its investigation into an incident from last month's primary where some 1,500 phantom votes were recorded on Sequoias tabulator after being uploaded from a paper ballot system. There should have been just over 300 votes, instead of thousands, from Precinct 141.

Shafer had originally claimed (as usual) human error and static electricity were to blame. When the incident was first discovered in September, Shafer told the Washington Post: "There's absolutely no problem with the machines in the polling places. No. No."

Turns out, Shafer lied. Again. As the D.C. report notes Sequoia was "too quick to exonerate itself and the equipment used in the tabulation process" and that "the evidence appears to indicate that there was a problem both in equipment (the server) and in the software"...

Last month, the Computer Security Group at UC Santa Barbara released a video showing exactly how to hack a touch-screen Sequoia voting system --- in such a way that even a manual count of the system's "paper trails" would not have revealed the hack. In 2006, just days before the general elections, The BRAD BLOG revealed how a yellow button on the back of Sequoia's touch-screen systems could be pressed in such a way as to allow any voter to vote as many times as he/she liked.

Sequoia is America's number three voting equipment vendor, allowed to do business in 17 states, including D.C. The same machines that have been failing spectacularly in recent primary elections will be used again, as is, in this November 4th's general election. Even the yellow buttons are still there.

The incident in D.C., however (as well as the one in Palm Beach County, FL, where their op-scan systems were unable to count the same ballots the same way twice!) was on one of the company's paper ballot electronic voting systems. From WaPo late last week [emphasis added]...

The report, released yesterday, says Sequoia Voting Systems, a California-based firm, "was too quick to exonerate itself and the equipment used in the tabulation process. . . . To date, the evidence appears to indicate that there was a problem both in equipment (the server) and in the software."
The report dismisses Sequoias theories that human error or static discharge, not defective software or hardware, was at fault when a cartridge from Precinct 141 added thousands of votes. It commits the special committee to examine the effectiveness of the three-member elections board and its top staff.

But those issues cannot be resolved before the Nov. 4 election, which officials expect will draw a record number of voters. The committees recommendations include actions to be taken Election Day.

A significant step is to train poll workers to persuade voters to use optical-scan machines instead of electronic touch-screen ones, although the primary night blunder has been traced to a cartridge from an optical-scan machine.

[Original article accepts comments]